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LAw and Equity are now one; Admiralty remains apart. Perhaps it is not
yet time to question the necessity of this historic disjunction,1 but it may be
recognized that a certain amount of friction will be generated through the
parallel operation of separate admiralty and law systems, each with its char-
acteristic remedies, rights and procedures.2 In the field of maritime personal
injury cases, however, the inherent difficulties of a dual system have been
severely aggravated by the operation of a series of additional factors which
serve partially to explain, if not to justify, the present complexit3, that besets
an essentially simple legal problem.3
It cannot be said that the respective cognizances of King's Bench and the
Admiralty courts in England were ever clarified beyond dispute.4 In the
United States, the Constitution engrafted upon this ill-defined judicial dual-
1. There is no current articulate movement favoring a merger of Law and Admiralty.
The need for flexibility in the operation of the present dual system receives occasional
oblique reference. See McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Co., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass.
1947); Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co., 141 F. 2d 226 (C.C.A. 2d 1944); Morrison,
The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 YALE L. J. 1 (1933).
2. "The statutes, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the decisions of the courts all
clearly recognize that jurisdiction in admiralty is quite separate and apart from jurisdiction
at law. Admiralty is still a separate field of law and has its own rules, methods, and pro-
cedure." Rowley v. Sierra S. S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N. D. Ohio 1942). And see
Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375,388-9 (1924).
3. Standard general statements of the law of maritime personal injuries include:
AXTFLL, MERCHANT SEAmEN'S LAW (1943) (a simplified survey for the layman); 1 BE:.-
DicT, ADmIRALTY §§ 22, 25, 27-31, 134, 140-8a (6th ed. 1940); 4 id. §§ 627-42; Ronmso.v,
ADmRAmnTY §§ 10, 13-8, 35-44, 57 (1939); Robinson, The Seaman in American 2Marilime
Law, 16 B.U.L. Rnv. 283 (1936); Willock, Commentary on 2faritime Workers, 46 U.S.C.A.
211 (1944), as revised, 46 U.S.C.A. 12 (Supp. 1946). See also LORD ,IN, SPRAGUE, CASES ON
ADmIRALTY, c. 1, §§ 4, 9, 10 (2d ed. 1939); id., c. 3. Radical developments in the field under
discussion have rendered these studies inaccurate in significant respects. See 32 VA. L. REv.
1177 (1946).
4. Historical reviews of the jurisdictional struggle between the English Admiralty
Courts and the Common Law Courts may be found in 4 BENEDicT, op. cit. supra note 3,
§§ 672-704; RoscoE, AD IRALTY PRACTICE 1-36 (5th ed. 1931); Laing, Historic Origins of
Admiralty Jurisdiction in England, 45 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1946); Mears, The History of the
Admiralty Jurisdiction in 2 SELECT EssAYs n; ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISToRY 3.12 (1908);
Morris, The Jurisdiction and Practice of the High Court of Admiralty of England, 4 SOL. J.
115, 137 (1859). See also the opinion of Story, J., in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418,
No. 3, 776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
Additional complications arise from the fact that the admiralty courts of the colonies
developed quite disparate concepts of remedies and jurisdiction from those adopted in Eng-
land. The Supreme Court in Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U. S. 133 (1943), had occasion to
review the powers of the colonial courts of admiralty in detail. The footnotes to the ma-
jority opinion of Stone, C. J., contain an elaborate collection of the relevant historical au-
thorities. Black, J., dissenting, retaliates with further citation. For a brief summary of this
point consult 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 707-18.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ity a political duality of sovereignty gearing the jurisdiction of the admi-
ralty courts to the federal political unit5, and thus compounded the prob-
lems of adjustment of jurisdiction and applicable substantive principles by
the injection of serious constitutional issues. The constitutional grant was
not exclusive, however, and the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789, jealous
of their states' newly won sovereignty, incorporated in the statutory pro-
vision for federal maritime jurisdiction a clause "saving to suitors the right
of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," 0
interpreted as granting the suitor his election of state or federal forum except
where the action is the ancient and peculiarly maritime proceeding in rent.
The in rem action was not a "common law remedy" and only the federal
courts were held competent to provide it? Over a period of a century the
Supreme Court proceeded to develop the national admiralty law jettisoning
one traditional English doctrine after another,8 while the state courts applied
their own doctrines and their own procedures in maritime cases brought in
the state forum by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause.9 Suddenly Mr.
5. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2: "The judicial power shall extend . . . to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ." Perhaps because the point is self-evident it is
seldom noted that it is this constitutional gearing of admiralty jurisdiction to federal power
which introduces into the subject its major complexities. Attempts to tinker with admiralty
jurisdiction invariably run afoul of problems of federal and state sovereignty. The involved
remedial structure surrounding maritime personal injuries is to a considerable extent at-
tributable to this factor.
6. 1 STAT. 76-7 (1789), 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(3), 371 (1940). Note that the asserted neces.
sity of this qualification'lies in the constitutional provision which links admiralty jurisdic-
tion with the federal judiciary.
7. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3,776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441 (U. S. 1847); The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411 (U. S. 1866); The Hilne v.
Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 (U.S. 1866); The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624 (U.S. 1868); The Glide, 167 U.S.
606 (1897); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903); Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry and
Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303 (1915) (distinguishing an in personam action with a concurrent
attachment).
It is the general statement in all treatises that the state courts may entertain no in rent
suit against a res cognizable in admiralty. 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 21; RODIN-
soN, ADMIRALTY 359 (1939). This has-today been modified sharply, however, by the declsion
in Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943), wherein the power of the state to declare for-
feit a maritime res in illegal use was upheld.
8. For the history of this development, consult 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. snpra note 3,
§ 734 et seg.; Sprague, The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Growth of Substanth,
Maritime Law in the United States Since 1835 in 3 LAw, A CENTURY OF PROGItESs 294
(1937); Hughes, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Admiralty and Common Law Courts, 6 TEX.
B. J. 156 (1943).
9. Cases reflecting this older practice include: La Bourgogne, 210 US. 95 (1908);
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 V. S. 638 (1900);
The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874) (the har-
binger of the Jensen case, establishing the rule of "uniformity" within the federal judiciary);
Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389 (U.S. 1874); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (US.
1872); Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236 (U.S. 1871); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 298




Justice McReynolds, speaking for a bare majority of the Court in the cele-
brated Jensen case, announced in 1917 that the intention of the forefathers
in granting maritime jurisdiction to the federal judiciary was to guarantee
"uniformity" in the law of the sea, and that this "uniformity" must be re-
tained regardless of the forum of litigation.' The case represents the Erie v.
Tompkins of the admiralty field except that the shoe is on the other foot, the
state courts being obliged to follow "substantive" la,,, as declared by the
Supreme Court, but left free to apply their own "procedure." n Qualified by
10. So. Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). A workman killed in New York
harbor had applied for and received compensation under that state's workmen's comp.ns-a-
tion statute. The Supreme Court held the award invalid and asserted the proposition that a
state has no power to legislate concerning matters maritime where the legislation would
work "material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law." The
decision is also predicated upon a second ground that only a "common law remedy" is saved
to the suitor, and that in no sense may workmen's compensation be considered a "common
law remedy." It had already been held, however, that state modifications in the common
law remedy did not foreclose a suit under the "saving to suitors" clause. Steamboat Co. V.
Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (U.S.1872); Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763
(D.N.J. 1915); and see the dissents of Holmes and Pitney, JJ., in the Jensen case.
11. The full implications of the doctrine remain yet unclaified, but the decisions in the
Jensen case and Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), distinguLhing
between "rights" and "remedies," would seem to permit of no other conclusion. See Carlisle
Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); Knapp v. United States Trans. Co., 181 App.
Div. 432, 170 N.Y. Supp. 384 (4th Dep't 1918). The usual difficulties in discriminating "sub-
stance" from "procedure" are encountered. In Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893), it
was decided that the common law rule of contributory negligence as a bar should apply in
admiralty actions brought by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause, to the exclusion of the
maritime rule of divided damages. The decision remains on the books and is followed,
though it would seem irreconcilable with the many cases following the Cheltntis doctrine.
Precedents are collected in 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 55 n. 77. See also Wilkins
v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 20 Wash. 2d 422, 147 P. 2d 524 (1944), refusing to depart from
the old rule in the absence of a later express mandate of the highest court. The decision
seems irifluenced by the opinion of Hand, J., in In re Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 F. 2d 559
(C.C.A. 2d 1931) where the contributory negligence rule is categorized as a matter of "pro-
cedure." Consult Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rnv. 15 (1928); fole and Wil-
son, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Copx. L. Q. 333 (1932); 34 CALIF. L. REv. 599
(1946).
In the very recent admiralty case of Lascovich v. Samovar, 1947 Am. Afar. Cas. 1046
(N.D.Cal. 1947), the district court adopts and applies the local state rule of manufacturer
liability to parties not buyers where failure to discover a defect led to the injury. Though
this rule is not adopted in all states, nor presumably will be applied by federal courts in
jurisdictions where the doctrine is not followed, the essential "uniformity" of maritime law
will not be "prejudiced", the court explains.
The Supreme Court has recently decided that the state courts must give effect to the
admiralty doctrine that the burden of proof falls to the party seeking to establish the validity
of a seaman's release, even though the state's law places the burden upon the party urging
its invalidity. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239 (1942), 17 Tc'ui'. L.Q.
194 (1943), 91 U. oF P.. L. REv. 667 (1943). A similar result has been reached regarding
classification of burden of proof as substantive under the Erie v. Tomphins doctrine. Cf.
Sampson v. Channel, 110 F. 2d 754 (C.C.A. 1st 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
There is no indication that the decision in Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
1947]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the added shadowy concept that state law may operate where the matter is
"maritime but local," 12 and where it will work no prejudice to the "essen-
tial uniformity" of the admiralty law, the Jensen doctrine is a vague com-
mon denominator that underlies the whole field of modern admiralty law. 13
Against this perplexed doctrinal background were thrust a series of federal
statutes14 radically modifying the traditional rights of injured maritime
workers, and raising large new remedial and jurisdictional questions for
judicial determination. The increasingly rapid and observable impact of
twentieth century social philosophy and a "new" Supreme Court has pro-
vided a final unsettling influence upon an already uncertain segment of the
law.
(1938), will affect the uniformity rule of the Jensen case. Apparent conflict may be ration-
alized on the basis of the recognized pre-existence of a federal maritime law, and the constitu-
tional grant.
12. This limiting doctrine arose almost immediately upon the announcement of the
Jensen rule, and indeed was implicit in that opinion itself. See 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde,
257 U.S. 469 (1922). Consult ROBINSON, AmIRALTY § 14 (1939). See pp. 269-70 infra.
See 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 34-5, for collection and treatment of the cases
"delineating" the scope of permissible applicability of state legislation in matters maritime.
13. The Jensen case represents a favorite topic for scholastic disputation. Conlen,
Admiralty's Jurisdictional Problem (Twenty-Five Years After the Jensen Case), 16 TH51r.
L.Q. 311 (1942); Conlen, Ten Years of the Jensen Case, 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 926 (1928);
Cunningham, The Tables Turned-Lord Coke Demolished, 55 AMi. L. REv. 685 (1921); Cun-
ningham, Is Every County Court in the United States a Court of Admiralty? 53 A,.. L. R v. 749
(1919); Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law, 21
COL. L. REV. 647 (1921); Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty Jurisdiction, 40 JouNs HoPIns
UNIVERSITY STIMIEs 287 (1922); Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction-ofLate Years, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 529 (1924); Hughes, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Admiralty and Common Law
Courts, 6 TEx. B. J. 156 (1943); Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law,
38 YALE L.J. 472 (1929); Palfrey, The Common-Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36 HARV.
L. REv. 777 (1923); Stumberg, Maritime Cases in Common Law Courts, 3 T.x. L. REv. 246
(1925); Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. or PA. L. RV.
123, 223 (1925); Note, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: The Jensen Doc-
trine Re-examined, 10 U. OF CmI. L. REV. 339 (1943); Note, A Memorandum Decision, 40
HARv. L. REV. 485 (1927).
The view of the present Supreme Court is somewhat more humble than the dogmatic
interpretation of Mr. Justice McReynolds. "Examination of the legislative history of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 does not disclose precisely what its framers had in mind when in § 9
they used the phrase 'common law remedy'. " Stone, C. J., in Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133, 148 (1943). The late Chief Justice's disapproval of the entire Jensen doctrine is
reflected in his dissent to Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U. S. 249 (1942). See, too, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter for the Court in Caldarola v. Thor Eckert Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1569 (1947),
where he concedes that the "rights" and "remedies" dichotomy and the state and federal
duality concept are not entirely clear. Cf. Rutledge, J., dissenting, id. at 1572.
14. Of direct relevance to the subject of this discussion are 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1940) (Jones Act); 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seg. (1940) (Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761
et seq. (1940) (Death on the High Seas Act). See generally for statutes pertaining to rights
of seamen, 46 U.S.C., c. 18 (1940); AXTELL, op. cit. supra note 3; Robinson, The Seaman in
American Admiralty Law, 16 B.U.L. REV. 283 (1936).
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The sheer multiplicity of remedy and forum available under slightly vary-
ing circumstances to the maritime worker who is injured is completely in-
commensurate with the difficulty of the tort problem presented, and a con-
siderable portion of the uncertainty which is present derives from this very
multiplicity. Rights and selection of the proper remedy are made to turn
upon a series of more or less predictable, more or less irrational distinctions
of fact or law. For purposes of discussion, it is convenient to classify these
rights and remedies into those which were available to the injured seaman
under the general maritime law, and those which were later superimposed
by statute.
REMEDIES UNDER GENERAL MARITIM LAW
M21aintenance and Cure
In the remedy of maintenance and cure, the general law of the sea devel-
oped the first operating system of Workmen's compensation known to Anglo-
Saxon law. Proudly the admiralty courts trace the ancestry of the injured
seaman's right to maintenance and cure back some twenty-five hundred
years to the legendary law of the thalassocracy of Rhodes." Under the doc-
trine as interpreted by American admiralty law,1' any seaman who is injured
or taken ill while in the service of his ship is entitled absolutely to compen-
sation for his expenses of maintenance and cure "at least to end of the voy-
age",1 7 and under modem interpretation for a "reasonable" time thereafter.1 8
15. AXTELL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 53. Whether the seamen who sailed under the
Colossus were entitled to such compensation is not actually mownm, but it is certain that the
great admiralty codes drawn up in the era of the Crusades to regulate the merchant trade
of the cities of the Hanse League and of Oleron and Wisbuy made provision for the liability
of the ship owner to recompense any seaman injured while in the service of his ship. Laws of
Oleron, Arts. VI, VII; Laws of Wisbuy, Arts. XVIII, XLX; Laws of the Hanse Towms, Arts.
XXXIX, XLV; Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Marine Contracts, Title Fourth, Arts.
XI, XII. The codes are reprinted in 30 Fed. Cas. 1171-1216. See RoniNsox, ADxn=r
§ 36 (1939).
16. The classic expositions in American case law are the opinions of Story, J., in Harden
v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6047 (C.C.D. Me. 1823), and Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed.
Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). Too recent to
be considered classic, Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. and its companion case, Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724 (1943), contain thorough treatments of the subject.
Consult 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61, 253, 364; LORD AND SPRAGUE, CASiES ON
An _zLar 331 et seg. (1939); ROBINSON, ADmIRALTY § 36 (1939); Comment, Admiralty
Right to Maintenance and Cure, 38 ILL. L. REv. 193 (1943) (a complete and excellent analy-
sis).
17. This vague phrase is from The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). It is probable that the
right to wages extends to but n ,t beyond the termination of the voyage. City of Alexandria,
17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); William Penn, 1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1925);
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938); McManus v. Marine Transport Lines,
149 F. 2d 969 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) (where the cases are collected and reviewed). But ef. The
Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (C.C.A. 2d 1917); Meyer v. Dollar Line S.S. Co., 49 F. 2d 1002
(C.C.A. 9th 1931).
18. The Pochasset, 295 Fed. 6 (C.C.A. 1st 1924); The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831
1947]
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The right is 'said to arise in neither tort nor contract, but to be an incident
of the seaman's status 9 enforceable against the owner or operator or against
the vessel "down to the last plank." Since it is treated as a "relational"
right, the recovery of maintenance and cure does not bar prosecution of any
other contractual or delictual remedies which may be available to the sea-
man for his injury or illness.20 Negligence on the seaman's part has no rele-
(C.C.A. 2d 1917);The Ipswich,46 F. 2d 136 (D.Md. 1930); The Eastern Dawn, 25 F. 2d 322
(E.D.Pa. 1928); Geistlinger v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 295 Fed. 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1924); The Cliftwood, 280 Fed. 726 (S.D.Ala. 1922); The W. L. White, 25 Fed. 503 (S.D.
N.Y. 1885). Contra: The Tammerlane, 47 Fed. 822 (N.D.Cal. 1891); The J. F. Card, 43 Fed.
92 (E.D.Mich. 1890); The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). These latter
cases refused to follow the liberal doctrine as expounded by Judge Story in Reed v. Can-
field, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C.C.D.Mass. 1832). For a bizarre bit of reasoning ra-
tionalizing the conflicting cases, see Enochasson v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 7 F. 2d 674 (SD.
Tex. 1925); 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 254.
The courts have been especially troubled by the problem of duration of liability where
the seaman suffers from an incurable disease. The shipowner is clearly not obligated to
make payments until death, the general rule seeming to require only that the reward be
paid until medical art has cured to the extent that it is possible to cure. RoDiNsoN, AD-
MiE ALTY 295-9 (1939); Luksich v. Misetich, 140 F, 2d 812 (C.C.A. 9th 1944). See Lindquist
v. Dilkes, 127 F. 2d 21 (C.C.A. 3d 1942) (urinary trouble); Interocean S.S. Co. v. Behrend-
sen, 128 F. 2d.506 (C.C.A. 6th 1942) (intestinal trouble); Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.
2d 690 (C.C.A. 3d 1941) (cancer); Calmar S. S. Co. v. Taylor, 92 F. 2d 84 (C.C.A. 3d 1937),
rev'd, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) (Buerger's Disease). Intervening employment does not appear to
affect the right to recovery. Loverich v. Warner Co., supra; Note, 22 OHIo Ors. 256 (1942).
19. ROBINsoN, ADmIRALTY 293 (1939); Waterman S. S. Co. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724, 730
(1943); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932); The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158, 172 (1903). The significance of this special characterization of the right as an
"incident to status" may be observed in the very recent case of Taylor v. United Fruit Co.,
1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 164 (N.Y. City Ct. 1946) (standby seaman not under articles collects
maintenance and cure), and Martinez v. Marine Transport Lines, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 529
(N.Y. City Ct. 1947) (seaman collects maintenance and cure where injured before signing
articles)., Where the result of the decision does not require that the duty be termed "rela-
tional", the courts will loosely use the "contract" syntax. See, e.g., Dryden v. Ocean Ace.
and Guar. Corp., 138 F. 2d 291 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
20. 4 BENEpICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 199; Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, 278
U.S. 130, 138 (1928). More recent affirmations include Muise v. Abbott, 160 F. 2d 590
(C.C.A. 1st 1947); Runyan v. Great Lakes D. & D. Co., 141 F. 2d 396 (C.C.A. 6th 1944);
Rankin v. Iron City S. & G. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 26 (W.D.Pa. 1947); Mosseller v. United
States, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See also Jones v. Waterman S. S. Co., 155
F. 2d 992 (C.C.A. 3d 1946), reversing the District Court decision that the seaman could not
urge both the Jones Act and maintenance and cure as separate grounds of recovery. Smith v.
Lykes Bros.-Ripley S. S. Co., 105 F. 2d 604 (C.C.A. 5th 1939), and Chiloil, 1939 Am. Mar,
Cas: 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), seem to require that separate actions be brought. Contra: The
Progress, 21 F. Supp. 572 (W.D.Wash. 1937); Owens v. Hammond Lbr. Co., 8 F. Supp. 392
(N.D.Cal. 1934); Roebling's Sons Co. v. Erickson, 261 Fed. 986 (C.C.A. 2d 1919). And see
Gibson v. International Freighting Corp., 71 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.Pa. 1947), where plaintiff
was refused his motion to withdraw his claim for maintenance and cure after having joined it
with another cause. Muise v. Abbott, supra, emphasizes the distinctive nature of the cause
of action for maintenance and cure in permitting recovery against the shipowner even though
the seaman injured on a dock had given a release to the wharf-owner after a settlement.
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vance to the collection of maintenance and cure in general, 21 although re-
covery has occasionally been denied where the seaman was guilty of gross
negligence or wilful misconduct 2 2 or had wilfully concealed a latent illness
or injury.23
It is probable that the old cases on maintenance and cure would have
permitted recovery by the signed crew member who had suffered injury
while off duty ashore; -4 but, influenced perhaps by the "arising out of" re-
quirement of statutory workmen's compensation schemes, there slowly ac-
cumulated a body of authority which denied recovery except where the
injury occurred "in the line of duty" on shipboard. - This doctrine was
expressly branded heresy by the Supreme Court in the recent appositely titled
case of Waterman S.S. Co. v. David Jones.26 Reviewing the older cases, and
utilizing the usual argument that the peculiar hazards of the mariner's calling
require that he be granted special protection, the Court pointed out that
shore leave constitutes necessary rehabilitation to the seaman, enabling him
to perform his duties while on ship board, that it militates to the benefit of
21. "Conceptions of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assump-
tion of risk have no place in the liability or defense against it." Aguilar v. Standard Oil,
318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943).
22. Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 645 (D.Ore. 1880); The Ben Flint, 3 Fed. Cas. 183,
No. 1,299 (D. Wisc. 1867). Venereal disease and accidents arising from exc .ive imbibition
seem least in favor. The authorities are collected in Aguilar v. Standard Oil, supra note 21,
at 731, n. 10, 11
23. Tawada v. United States, 1947 Am.Mar.Cas. 947 (C.C.A. 9th 1947); Burns v.
United States, 62 F. Supp. 603 (E.D.Pa. 1945); Writer v. The Richmond, 30 Fed. Cas. 718,
No. 18,104 (D.Pa. 1807).
24. There is no question that this was Mr. Justice Story's opinion, and the dicta in
Reed -.% Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C.C.D.Mass. 1832), clearly indicates this
view of admiralty history. See also The S. S. Benvindglen, 88 F. 2d 125 (C.C.A. 1st 1937).
25. These cases and the bootstrap method by which each raised itself upon the others
are traced in 38 ILL. L. REv. 193, 201-7 (1943). Meyer v. Dollar S. S. Line, 49 F. 2d 1002
(C.C.A. 9th 1931); Collins v. Dollar S. S. Lines, 23 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); The
President Coolidge, 23 F. Supp. 575 (N.D.Wash. 1938); Smith v. American South African
Line, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wahlgren v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 42 F.
Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). One case only had squarely taken the contrary view%. The J. M.
Danziger, 1938 Am.Mar.Cas. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
Two distinct issues are involved in these cases, but the decisions do not alw.-ays dis-
criminate between them. (1) May the recovery be had for injuries suffered ashore? (2) May
the recovery be had for injuries not sustained in the "line of duty"? The latter Nas con-
sidered the primary consideration apparently, for the injured seamen in a few cases had
succeeded -when injured performing a chore on land. The Montezuma, 19 F. 2d 355 (C.C.A.
2d 1927). But a seaman injured on board in a "friendly scuffle" was denied recovery since
he was not in the service of his ship, the court drawing analogy to the United States Navy
notion of "line of duty." Meyer v. Dollar S.S. Line, supra. See Note, 4 L.R.J (u.s.) 71
(1906) for older cases as to the seaman's right to maintenance and cure if injured in personal
avocation.
26. The opinion of the court was delivered for the Waterman case and a companion
case. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); 22 Tax. L. Ra. 239 (1944);
7 U. OF DETRorr L.J. 18 (1943). For a note on the circuit court opinion, 130 F. 2d 797
(C.C.A. 3d 1942), see 29 VA. L. REv. 498 (1943).
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the ship, and that hence the owner's and the vessel's liability to pay main-
tenance and cure extends to compensate all injuries sustained by the seaman
so long as he is signed on the vessel, regardless of the situs of the injury.Y
The case represents an affirmative assertion of the distinctly favorable atti-
tude of the present majority toward the extension of absolute liability as a
technique for placing the burdens of workmen's personal injuries upon the
society as a whole. Presented with two equally respectable bodies of prece-
dent, the Court unhesitatingly chose that one which supported such an
extension.
With the Waterman ddcision, the substantive elements of the seaman's
right to maintenance and cure may be considered relatively well clarified,
though litigation continues on the questions of who is a "seaman" 28 for pur-
poses of its remedy, and what shall be considered a "reasonable" time of
payment. It is also settled that the mariner may enforce his right by a libel
either in personam or in rem in the federal courts on the admiralty side, and
that, by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause, an in personam action may
be brought in the state courts and on the common law side of the courts
of the United States.2 9 But there is confusion as to the jurisdictional require-
ments for such a common law action in the federal court. The proposition
27. Thus the Waterman decision presents a clear affirmative to both of the questions
suggested in note 25 supra. The pragmatic effect of the opinion would seem to be a com-
plete abandonment of the "service of the ship" requirement, but the opinion restricts itself
to the geographical facts in the case and says "How far [liability] extends beyond that point
we need not now determine." 318 U.S. 724, 737 (1943). Interesting cases extending the
doctrine still further include Nowery v. Smith, 69 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.Pa. 1946), aft'd, 161 F.
2d 732 (C.C.A. 3d 1947) (seaman injured in barroom fracas); Moss v. Alaska Packers
Ass'n, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 493 (App. Dept. of Sup. Ct., San Francisco, Cal. 1945) (another
barroom case); Sullivan v. United States, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (seaman
assaulted in street); Taylor v. United Fruit Co., 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 164 (N.Y.City Ct.
1946) (standby seaman assaulted). One opinion delivered soon after the Waterman decision
attempts to restrict that holding closely to its facts. The court seems to apply the strange
criteria that the injury must be received in the vicinity of the ship and upon private, not
public, property. Siclana v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). A court has
recently balked at holding the shipowner liable where the seaman turned an ankle while
visiting a friend's house seven miles from his own home where he was temporarily on leave,
but the rationale is obscure. Smith v. United States, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 481 (E.D.Va.
1946).
28. Cases are collected in 38 ILL. L. REv. 193, at 194 n. 6 (1943). The decisions are not
predictable; it is agreed that the facts of each case govern and that the result must depend
upon the purpose for which the injured person is to be classified. See RoBINsox, ADMIRALTY
§ 35 (1939); Anderson v. Manhattan Ltge. Co., 148 F. 2d 971 (C.C.A.2d 1945). It is of
significance to note, however, that longshoremen are uniformly agreed not to be "seamen"
for purposes of maintenance and cure. Calvino v. Farley, 23 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
C. Flanagan & Sons Inc. v. Carken, 11 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), 42 HARV. L. Ruv.
820 (1929). See Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 101 (C.C.A.3d 1945); Yacont v.
Brady and Gioe, Inc., 246 N.Y. 300,307,158 N.E, 876, 878 (1927).
29. 4 BENEDICT, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 200; ROBINSON, ADMIIRALTY 292 (1939); The
Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (C.C.A.2d 1917). See cases collected in McDonald v. Cape Cod
Trawling Co., 71 F. Supp. 888,891 (D.Mass. 1947).
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is asserted in Benedict's treatise that both the $3,000 jurisdictional amount
and diversity of citizenship are necessary for the action to be entertained,19
but he cites no authority, and subsequent cases supporting the view mainly
cite Benedict.31 There is some support for the view that the doctrine of pend-
ency will give the federal court jurisdiction over the claim for maintenance
and cure where it is joined with a related cause of action for which jurisdic-
tion is regularly established.
32
The essential substantive and administrative simplicity of the doctrine of
maintenance and cure renders it the least controversial of the remedies
accorded injured seamen. It would seem that the limits of its possible appli-
cability have been reached and that no radical developments may be anti-
cipated. But the benefits which may be recovered are at best inadequate for
they are in no way geared to wages but are closely restricted to small periodic
payments to recompense for expenses incurred while the worker is incapaci-
tated.33 Once virtually the sole remedy of the injured seaman, maintenance
and cure has come to represent a supplemental guaranteed remedy, helpful,
but no longer primary.
Maritime Tort: Unseaworthiness
The general maritime law perhaps afforded one exception to the proposi-
tion that maintenance and cure represented the exclusive remedy available
30. 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 201.
31. Modin v. Matson Nay. Co., 128 F. 2d 194 (C.C.A.gth 1942); Hiltz v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co., 57 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.Pa. 1944). But sec Thornes v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 37
F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The view taken by Benedict would seem the proper one if
the premise be adopted that the federal court is today a bivalve and that jurisdictional com-
petence of one chamber does not imply similar authority by the other. See discussion in
note 109 infra. It is strange, however, that the question should remain unsettled and that
there should be so little actual authority for any position.
32. Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (C.C.A.3d 1942); Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp.,
112 F.2d 515 (C.C.A. 1st 1940); Stevens v. R. O'Brien & Co., 62 F.2d 632 (C.C.A. 1st 1933).
See particularly the extended discussion by Vyzanski, J., in McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawl-
ing Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D.Mass. 1947).
33. A judgment obtained does not bar later actions if it appears that further expenses
have been incurred. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). Generally lump sum
payments based on expectancy are frowned upon. Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690
(C.C.A.3d 1941). Since the payments are restricted to actual expenses, the seaman ,-as
held entitled to no maintenance where he was living with his parents. United States v. John-
son, 160 F.2d 789 (C.C.A.9th 1947). Furthermore, the employer's duty is discharged when
he presents a certificate of entry into a United States Marine Hospital, at least for the period
while the seaman is an in-patient. RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY 295 (1939); United States v.
Loyola, 161 F.2d 126 (C.C.A.9th 1947); Tawada v. United States, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 947
(C.C.A.9th 1947) Moyle v. National Petroleum Tr. Co., 150 F.2d 840 (C.C.A.2d 1945) (dis-
charge from hospital at request of seaman does not bar him from further suit for maintenance
and cure). Convention No. 55 of the International Labor Conference, concerning the ship-
owner's obligation to seamen, was ratified by the Senate in 1938. Implementing legislation
passed the House of Representatives in 1939. 84 CONG. Rc. 10546 (1939); H.R. 6881,76th
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to the injured seaman.3 4 Derived, it is said, from the ancient right of the
crew to abandon an unseaworthy vessel, 35 the doctrine in admiralty devel-
oped that a shipowner was under a non-delegable" duty to indemnify any
seaman injured as a result 7 of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. 3 The ad-
miralty judge of a few centuries back would probably not be disturbed at
the modern interpretation of the remedy of maintenance and cure, but he
might well be excused for raising an eyebrow upon learning of the vicissitudes
of the remedy for "unseaworthiness."
There are cases on record which hold or imply that the negligence of the
shipowner is a necessary factor in his liability under the doctrine of "unsea-
worthiness." , Their interest today, is primarily historical. Step by step,
the highest tribunal has rendered the nature of the shipowner's duty more
exacting, his obligations more extensive, and his defenses less effective.
40
In 1939, assumption of risk was banned as a plea to an action grounded upon
defective equipment; 41 and in 1943 the owner was held liable under the
Congress, 1st Session. The Convention works no major changes in respect to maintenanc
and cure. See 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 293 el seq.
34. Mention must be made of a derivative right which inured to the seaman and which
may be treated as another exception. In the event of failure on the part of the ship to pro-
vide adequate maintenance and care to its injured seamen, there was created a right of ac-
tion to indemnity for aggravation caused by the neglect to treat. Of significance when there
was no general cause of action against the shipowner for negligence, this collateral, almost
penal, sanction has been absorbed by the Jones Act, p. 258 infra. Consult Robinson, The
Seaman in American Admiralty Law, 16 B.U.L. REv. 283, 294 (1936); The Iroquois, 194
U.S. 240 (1904); The Cuzco, 154 Fed. 177 (C.C.A.2d 1907); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932), and cases reviewed therein.
35.' The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 121n.2 (1936); Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99 (1944). The accuracy of this reference is problematical. See Seas Ship-
ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 91n.7 (1946).
36. Shields v. United States, 1947 Am. Mar, Cas. 453 (E.D.Pa. 1947); Francis v. Seas
Shipping Co., 158 F.2d 584 (C.C.A.2d 1946); Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan, 72 F.2d 490
(C.C.A.Sth 1934); Christopher v. Grueby, 40 F.2d 8 (C.C.A.lst 1930).
37. The injury must have been caused by the unseaworthy condition. The Baymead,
88 F.2d 144 (C.C.A.9th 1937); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 64 F.2d 198 (C.C.A. 6th 1933).
38. The doctrine has been firmly entrenched in the American body of maritime law
since 1903, when Brown, J., definitively surveyed the field of maritime personal injuries in
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). See Smith, Liability in the Admiralty for lnjuries to Sea-
men, 19 HARv. L. Rlv. 418 (1906). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions approving the
principle are collected in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99 (1944). See also
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
39. See the early cases collected in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100
(1944), and see further The Tawmie, 80 F.2d 792 (C.C.A.Sth 1936); The Cricket, 71 F,2d 61
(C.C.A.9th 1934); Kahyis v. Arundel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 492 (D.Md. 1933); Burton v. Greig,
271 Fed. 271 (C.C.A.5th 1921).
40. The progression may be traced through The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); Chelentia
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Saddanger, 259 U.S,
255 (1922); Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934); The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U.S. 110 (1936).
41. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424,428-9 (1939),
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remedy of "unseaworthiness" though the negligence of another had directly
caused the accident through use of the imperfect gear.42 The decision virtu-
ally renders the shipowner the absolute insurer of all equipment on the vessel.
If there were any doubts, however, as to the authoritative interpretation of
the nature of the shipowner's duty of providing "seaworthy" equipment,
they were resolved with finality in 1946 by the decision in Seas Shipping
Company v. Sieracki.43 The decision is significant in other respects which
will be adverted to subsequently," but of interest here is the statement by
the Court that the absolute right to indemnity arises "as an incident, not
merely of the seaman's contract, but of performing the ship's service with
the owner's consent." 45 In the hierarchy of duties owed seamen by the ship-
owner, this pinnacle of a "relational" duty existing over and above even
strict contractual obligation had been reserved exclusively to the hoary
remedy of maintenance and cure. 6 The decision establishes a simple equa-
tion: "Unseaworthiness" = Liability.
42. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Mr. Justice Roberts penned a
blistering jeremiad over the sad state to which stare decisis had fallen. The immediate
source of his anxiety about the stability of the law lay in the court's express disapproval of
Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928), to the extent that the older decision did not
conform with the decision reached in the later case. It is asserted that the Pinar case holds
that no recovery may be had under the doctrine of "unseaworthiness", regardless of the
nature of the obligation, if in fact the injury was contributed to by the negligence of a crew
member. (Note the legal-level distinction between this admiralty rule which denies any
initial liability, and the common-law doctrine of the "fellow servant' which is a defense to
what would otherwise lead to an imposition of liability.) In the Pinar case the mate selected
defective rope when there was good rope available; recovery was denied. The case was
argued, however, as an action under the Jones Act for negligence and the particular ques-
tion raised was whether such an action could be prosecuted in rem. Air. Justice McReynolds
makes the statement, id. at 155, that the "evidence would not support a recovery upon any
other theory," but it may at least be argued that, under the facts, this observation was
gratuitous. The argument in Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent to the Mahnich case that the
statement is not dicta because judges exercise great care not to deliver themselves of opinions
not required by the case at bar does not seem convincing. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,
supra at 108.
The case was extensively noted. See 13 FORD L. Rv. 132 (1944); 12 GEo. WV,'s,. L.
Rnv. 361 (1944); 92 U. or P.. L. Rnv. 459 (1944); 30 VA. L. REv. 486 (1944).
43. 328U.S. 85 (1946).
44. See p. 254 infra.
45. 328 U.S. 85, 97 (1946). The court stresses the point repeatedly, id. at 90-7. The
question concerned the entitlement of a longshoreman injured on board the ship through
defective equipment. Since the stevedore was not by usual contract notions an employee
of the vessel, but of an independent contractor, it was necessary that any owner's liability
be predicated upon a duty arising from the "status" or "relation" of the injured party.
46. The possible implications of such a new classification are interesting. The logic
that held maintenance and cure to be cumulative to other rights to indemnity because its
origin is "relational" would require a similar conclusion with regard to seaworthiness and
perhaps force the result of election between these ancient remedies, and permit recovery
under both the "unseaworthiness" and Jones Act negligence theories. It is not suggested that
these results will ensue, but only that the decision in the Sieracki case renders older rationales
unconvincing as bases for the distinctions drawn and remedies allowed.
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The infinite possibilities of injury which exist aboard a ship render prec-
edent of negligible assistance in determining what content the courts will
pour into the flask labelled "unseaworthiness." 41 Few would have thought
that the presence on board of a brutal mate 48 or a greenhorn untrained
sailor would render a ship "unseaworthy"; 41 or that a seaman would be
able to convince a court that he fell in the shower of a docked ship because
the soapy floor rendered it "unseaworthy." 10 To the courts has been handed
a simple instrument for the imposition of absolute liability with no limita-
tion but judicial conscience.
The Sieracki case not only expanded the liability of the shipowner verti-
cally, so to speak, but extended the scope of the remedy horizontally so as
to bring longshoremen within its purview. In reaching this result, the opin-
ion leans heavily upon the fiction created by Mr. Justice Holmes that long-
shoremen are "seamen" for purposes of suit under the Jones Act.8 1 This
distortion of common meaning found valid cause when no other remedy lay
available to longshoremen, but after the passage of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act52 the fiction had lain dormant.3 Thus
the Supreme Court again has resuscitated an older doctrine calculated to
promote the extension of the shipowner's liability, and again, in the word
"seaman," the courts are provided with another device for enlarging the
scope of the remedy. If, for example, the definition set forth in the Merchant
47. Cases are collected in 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 255 n.34; RoBINSoN,
ADMIRALTY 303 et seq. (1939); LORD AND SPRAGUE, CASES ON ADMIRALTY 337,349 (1939).
48. The Rolph, 293 Fed. 269 (N.D.Cal. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 52 (C.C.A.9th 1924).
49. The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944 (C.C.A.4th 1936), 85 U. or PA. L. REV. 318
(1937).
50. Kreyv. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (C.C.A.2d 1941), 28 VA. L. Ruv. 649.
51. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S.50 (1926); Jamison v. Encarna-
cion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
52. 44STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1940).
53. It had been thought prior to the Sieracki decision that the shipowner owed a duty
of due care to the longshoremen, whose position was deemed that of the business invitee.
E.g., Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (C.C.A.2d 1945), cerl. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945);
The Etna, 43 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.Pa. 1942);The Dalhem, 41 F. Supp. 718 (D.Mass, 1941);
The S.S. Anderson, 37 F. Supp. 695 (D.Md. 1941). A full collection of precedents is given in
34 CAL. L. REV. 601, 602 n. 6 (1946), but the unanimity of these authorities is no longer even
persuasive. Following the doctrine of the Sieracki case, see Fodera V. Booth American
Shipping Corp., 159 F.2d 795 (C.C.A.2d 1947). But cf. Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32
(C.C.A.2d 1947) (approving Grasso v. Lorentzen doctrine that the owner will not be held
liable where the defect was caused by the agents of the independent contractor); Bruszewski
v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 66 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.Pa. 1945) (seeking to limit the Sicracki doctrine
to longshoremen actually loading and unloading); Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 1947
Am. Mar. Cas. 899 (C.C.A.3d 1947) (refusing recovery where the injury occurred in the re-
moval of a defective boom, the court refusing to declare a constructive warranty of sea-
worthiness'of patently unseaworthy equipment). For a recrudescence of the due care-
business invitee notion (and an irrational result) see Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173
(C.C.A.2d 1947) (owner must compensate those stevedores who contracted dermatitis tin-




Seaman's Act should be adopted as a criterion, there would be no difficulty
whatever in extending the doctrine of "unseaworthiness" far beyond its
present application. The statute reads"... every person (apprentices ex-
cepted) who shall be employed or engaged to serve in any capacity on board
the . . . [vessel] . . . shall be deemed and taken to be a'seaman'." 54 And
a recent decision permitting a "seaworthiness" recovery by a land carpenter
injured on board ship demonstrates that the term "longshoreman" itself may
be amazingly elastic.
55
The scope of the remedy of "unseaworthiness" has never been extended
beyond the ship itself. It would be foolhardy to assert that it will not be.
Though additional distension might do further violence to the original con-
cept of the remedy, there seems to be no rational policy in permitting a
"seaman" to recover absolutely against the shipowner where he is, for ex-
ample, injured by a falling boom on the ship, but denying this remedy where
he is standing on a dock. Jurisdictional difficulties in designating such an
injury as a "maritime tort" would be encountered since under admiralty
doctrine a dock is an adjunct of the land,"0 but the expansion of the rights
to recovery under the maintenance and cure doctrine 17 and the recent ap-
plication of the Jones Act to injuries occuring on land 8 may well presage a
similar development in the doctrine of "unseaworthiness."
Like its companion maritime remedy, maintenance and cure, an action
for indemnity under the doctrine of "unseaworthiness" may be instituted
by a libel in personamn or in ren in admiralty. 9 Thus a concomitant to the
54. REv. STAT. § 4612 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 713 (1940).
55. Sulovitz v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 637 (E.D.Pa. 1945). The opinion of the 3d
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Sieracki case had already been handed down. The case is
interesting further in that an express finding of no negligence was made. The court said the
carpenter was a "longshoreman" and therefore the shipownerwas liable.
56. Cleveland Terminal R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908). The implica-
tions of an extension of this nature encounter one of the most controversial doctrines in
American admiralty law; viz., that admiralty courts have no jurisdiction over torts origi-
nating on navigable waters but consummated on land. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (US.
1865). The problem is treated at I BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 353 et seq.; RoiNsoN,
ADMIrALTY § 9 (1939); Sprague, The Fxtension of Admiralty Jurisdilion and the Growth of
Substantive Maritime Law in the United States Since 1835 in 3 LAW, A CErtuY OF PROGRESS
294 (1937); Farnum, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Amphibious Torts, 43 YALE L. J. 34 (1933);
Olverson, Admiralty and the Amphibious Tort Problem, 29 VA. L. R Ev. 1010 (1943). Efforts
by the admiralty bar associations to induce Congress to override the doctrine of The Ply-
mouth and its successors have been unsuccessful to date. See MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION
op =a UNITED STATES Doc. No. 311, REPORT OF CoMMIrrsE ON EXTENsioN OF ADMIRALTY
JURIsDICTION 3149 (May, 1947); 93 CONG. REc. 4478 (May 1, 1947).
57. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
58. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). See p. 261
infra. In effect the decisions of these last two cases at least undermine the rationale of the
Plymouth doctrine, though that principle treats primarily of the problems raised by am-
phibious torts to property rather than the person.
59. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). There have been no subsequent dissents
from this proposition.
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extension of the remedy is an expansion of those rights which may be en-
forced against the vessel itself. The traditional policy which views creation of
secret liens with disfavor because of their implications as to merchantability,
rights of creditors,"0 etc., may provide a braking factor countervailing the
operation of social considerations tending to expand the scope of the remedy,
Any deterrence which such considerations may provide is, however, par-
tially offset by the fact that the availability of the remedy in rem does
not imply that all actionswill be so prosecuted; for again under the
"saving to suitors" clause, the state and federal common law forums are
open to the injured seaman who wishes to assert his maritime right in per.
sonam before a jury.6 ' Furthermore, the Supreme Court's interesting deci-
sion in Hendry Co. v. Moore,62 that a state may enforce a state law against a
maritime res, may indicate thatthe present majority is not as wary of admi-
ralty proceedings in rem as might be supposed. There are today virtually
no observable limits to the doctrine of "unseaworthiness" as a judicial tech-
nique for distributing the human losses of the modern economy-and further
attenuation may be anticipated.
STATUTORY REMEDIES
Despite paternalistic notions that seamen are "wards of admiralty" and
require special protection,6 3 the general maritime law did not extend special
dispensations to mariners without exacting a price. Much in the same fash-
ion as modern workmen's compensation schemes represent a bargain between
employer and employee, the right to guaranteed compensation being ex-
changed for immunity from suit, the rights of injured seamen to recover
under the doctrines of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness repre-
sented exclusive remedies. The general maritime law simply did not recog-
nize the existence of a right to recover against an employer under a doctrine
of respondeat superior and imputed negligence." The third of the four famous
60. The argument is persuasively get forth by Chesnut, J., in his dissent in The State
of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944, 949 (C.C.A. 4th 1936), and apparently formed at least part of
the basis for the refusal of the Supreme Court to permit Jones Act suits to be prosecuted
in rem. Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
61. Seep. 244 supra.
62. 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
63. A paragraph on the seaman's hardships is the standard introduction to almost
every admiralty personal injury opinion. See, e.g., Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas, 426, No.
11,641 (D.Mass. 1832); The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (SD.N.Y, 1883); The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158 (1903); Aguilar v. Standard Oil of N.J., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). The persistency of
this paternalistic view regarding seamen is not easily explained. See Jones v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 1000 (C.C.A.3d 1946), where a modern court expresses its "opinion
that the relationship of the shipowner to the seaman is more closely analogouq to that of
father and child than to that of an employer to a mere employee."
64. Even the liberal doctrines of Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas, 426, 429, No. 11,641
(D.Mass. 1832), recognized that the owners "are not in any just sense liable for consequen-
tial damages," and see The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); The Osceola,
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propositions of The Osceola 5 couches this principle in terms of the fellow
servant rule, but since the absence of a negligence cause of action against
the shipowner far antedates the articulation of the doctrine of the fellow
servant," the historical accuracy of the explanation may be questioned.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1915 67 was the first statutory attempt to
provide injured seamen with a remedy for negligence against the shipowner.
Apparently following the statement in The Osceola that the difficulty lay in
the fellow servant rule, the Act specifically provided that "seamen having
command shall not be held to be fellow servants with those under their au-
thority." 6s Soon after its "uniformity" decision in the Jensen case, the Court
was presented with the case 69 of a seaman injured on navigable waters su-
ing his employer for negligence alternatively under the "saving to suitors"
clause and the above quoted section of the new Seamen's Act. In denying
recovery on the first ground, Mr. Justice McReynolds reasoned that rights
and remedies must be distinguished, that the clause by its terms merely
saved a "remedy where the common law is competent to give it" and that
therefore a suitor could not invoke a common law right where the matter was
maritime. He was entitled to elect to pursue a common law remedy where it
was available to enforce a right granted by the general maritime law, but
since no right to indemnity on a theory of imputed negligence was recognized
in admiralty, the "saving to suitors" clause provided no valid basis for the
complaint at bar.70 As to the second ground urged, the Court curtly dismissed
as "irrelevant" Congress' attempt to meet the fellow servant objection as
expounded in The Osceola, since the only rights recognized by the law of the
sea were those to maintenance and cure and to indemnity for unseaworthi-
ness, and in these the relation of the master and servant was immaterial.
The Act disclosed "no intention to impose upon shipowners the same mea-
189 U.S. 158 (1903); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). The state of
the law prior to legislative alteration is described in Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S.
130 (1928).
The recognition in The Osceola of the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship con-
stituted an adoption of the law as changed by statute in England. 39 & 40 Vicr., c. 80, § S
(1876); reenacted 57 & 58 VicT., c. 60, § 458 (1894). But without recognition of a negligence
cause of action, the defenses thereto of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were
also adopted. SeeHedleyv. Pinkney & Sons S.S. Co., [18941 A.C. 222. The actual decision
in The Osceola was that no recovery could be had against the owner where the mate had
given a negligent order. This transmutation of the common law defenses and general tort
concepts was noted with alarm at the time of the Osceola decision. Cunningham, Respondeat
Superior in Admiralty, 19 HARv. L. REv. 445 (1906); Cunningham, The Extension to the
Admiralty of the Fellow Senant Doctrine, 18 HARV. L. REv. 294 (1905).
65. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
66. Farwell v. B. & 11. Ry. Corp., 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842); Hough v. Railway Co., 100
U.S. 213 (1879).
67. Act Mar. 4, 1915, c. 153, § 20,38 STAT. 1185 (1915).
68. Ibid.
69. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
70. Id. at 383-4.
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sure of liability for injuries suffered by the crew while at sea as the common
law prescribes for employers in respect of their employees on shore" 11 and
therefore plaintiff could not prevail. 72
The Jones Act
Thus it was made clear that the only method for permitting injured sea-
men to recover against the shipowner for negligence was to create a new
cause of action and specifically engraft it upon the traditional law of the sea.
This the Jones Act did. 3 Two sentences long, its annotations in the United
States Code Annotated cover one hundred and thirty pages. It reads:
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall ap-
ply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such
personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring
or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway em-
ployees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be
under the court of the district in which the defendant employer re-
sides or in which his principal office is located."
The substantive elements of the cause of action granted injured seamen
have been fairly well crystallized by twenty-seven years of judicial construc-
tion of the Jones Act and thirty-nine years of interpretation of the Federal
Employers Liability Act.7 4 The "relational" right to maintenance and cure
remains unaffected, 75 the election required being that between an action for
indemnity under the doctrine of seaworthiness and an action for negligence
under the Jones Act.7 6 Some cases, however, seem to interpret the election
71. Id.at384.
72. It is difficult to ascertain just what the majority of the court believed Congress'
intent to have been if not to grant the seaman a cause of action grounded upon imputed
negligence, since the fellow servant rule was evolved specifically as a defense to that type of
action. It is not usual to attribute to the legislature an intent to enact a useless law.
73. 41STAT. 1007 (1920),46U.S.C. § 688 (1940).
74. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 el seq. A complete discussion of the problems
that have been raised and settled under this Act cannot be encompassed within this paper.
See 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 25; 4 id. § 612; RomiNsoN, ADMIRALTY §§ 39-44
(1939). It must be remembered, however, that these excellent treatments were written
prior to 1940, and that a substantial proportion of the statements made therein are today no
longer true, or stand in the shadow of judicial disfavor.
75. Note 20 supra.
76. Note 46 supra. See Roebling's Sons Co. v. Erickson, 261 Fed. 986 (C.C.A.2d 1919),
for the rationale of this choice., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927); Pacific
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley SS. Co., 105 F.2d
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clause to mean that the plaintiff may have but one recovery and hold that
the plaintiff may allege both grounds in his complaint and is entitled to a
reversal if he is forced to elect as between the separate allegations.7 The
action will lie only as against the employer -8 and by the terms of the statute
a showing of negligence of some description constitutes the gist of the ac-
tion. 9 The standard of care prescribed is that of the ubiquitous "reasonable
604 (C.C.A.Sth 1939) (assigning the nature of the seaworthiness remedy as delictual); Burk-
holderv. United States, 60 F. Supp. 700 (E.D.Pa. 1945) (an action based on unseaworthiness
may not be maintained after a suit under the Jones Act has been dismissed); accord, Plamals
v. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928); Vahlgren v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 58 F. Supp.
783 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42,45-6; 4 id. at 199; RonNso.,
ADSURALrY § 43 (1939). Acceptance of state workmen's compensation has been held an
election and a bar to a Jones Act suit, Owens v. Hammond Lbr. Co., 8 F. Supp. 392 (N.D.
Cal. 1934). For a contrary view, see Bay State D. & C. Co. v. Porter, 153 F.2d 827 (C.C.A.
1st 1946). There a signed release had been given, but since the decision in Garrett v. More-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), the most exacting requirements must be met to
render such a release valid. Other recent cases on the point include Stanley v. Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co., 1947 Am.Mar.Cas. 411 (Sup. Ct. San Francisco, Cal. 1947); United States v.
Johnson, 160 F.2d 789 (C.C.A.9th 1947).
77. German v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 1590 (C.C.A.3d 1946);
Capillo, 1934 Am. Mar. Cas. 1212 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1934). The statement in 4 Bs_,rzcim,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 201, that such a result could not obtain in the federal courts may be
discounted. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88 (1946), where the Supreme
Court shortly dismisses the objection to conducting the seaworthiness suit on the common-
law side of the court. Cases are collected there. But cf. Branic v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 152
F.2d 887 (C.C.A.3d 1945).
78. The point is well settled. See, e.g., The Norland, 101 F.2d 967 (C.C.A.9th 1939);
Duarte v. Christie Scow Co., 27 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Cases are collected in 55
YALE L. J. 584, 586 n.19 (1946). The question becomes of interest in attempts to remove
suits under the Jones Act. See note 104 infra.
79. Available analyses of this concept of "negligence" are not satisfactory, particularly
when considered in conjunction with the now fortified remedy under the doctrine of sea-
worthiness. The Supreme Court early laid down the principle that it would not be bound by
common-law concepts of negligence developed to protect ordinary workers, but would con-
sider the peculiar hazards of the sea and the traditional relations which obtain between the
ship owner and the seaman. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); cf.
Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930). This vague doctrine provides leeway for the
finding of "negligence" virtually as desired. See Nowery v. Smith, 69 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.Pa.
1946), aft'd, 161 F.2d 732 (C.C.A.3d 1947), for the most extreme case to date.
However flexible the "negligence" concept under the Jones Act may be, it cannot ap-
proach the efficacy of the "unseaworthiness" doctrine as an instrument for imposing liabil-
ity. Perhaps as a consequence of this, or perhaps because the asserted distinction is without
a difference, the Jones Act "negligence" notion and the "unseaworthiness" idea overlap and
blend indistinguishably. Compare The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C.C.A.9th 1924), with Koehler v.
Presque-Isle Tr. Co., 141 F.2d 490 (C.C.A.2d 1944), and Hong v. United States, 59 F. Supp.
794 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (where brutal seaman aboard, owner held in the first case for sending
forth an "unseaworthy vessel," and in the others for "negligence").
Virtually any cause of action may be couched in terms of negligence or unseaworthiners.
See, e.g., Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (C.C.A.2d 1941) (slippery shower). The
situation is further confused by the common law tort concept of "unsafe place to work" and
"defective equipment." In Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939), a seaman
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man" 80 and actions under the Act are treated like any other tort action ex-
cept insofar as modified by the general rules of admiralty law qualifed by
the provisions of the Employers Liability Act regarding permissible defenses.
Though the Supreme Court has had no occasion to deliver an explicit opin-
ion, it seems beyond question that the 1939 amendment of the Employers
Liability Act abolishing assumption of risk as a defense 81 is incorporated
by reference into the Jones Act 2 The attitude of the present Court toward
assumption of risk is reflected by their anticipation of the amendment in
rejecting the defense in an action under the Jones Act for negligent failure
to provide sound equipment." Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Tiller v. Atlan-
tic Coast Lines,14 an action by a railway employee under the amended Em-
was injured on a defective step. The complaint was cast as a Jones Act "negligence" action
for "defective equipment." The case arose prior to the 1939 amendment to the Employers
Liability Act abolishing assumption of risk as a defense. In an opinion not remarkable for
its clarity, the Court, at least without explicit recognition of its technique, held that assump-
tion of risk was not a valid defense to an action for "negligence" in providing "defective
equipment" because it could find no clear precedent which permitted it as a defense to an
action for an "unseaworthy" vessel. Similar mergers of these originally disparate ideas are
common. See Hendriksen v. City of Chicago, 330 I1. App. 141, 70 N.E.2d 848 (19,17),
where the alleged gravamen is negligence in not providing a "safe place to work" where a
fireman was not furnished with goggles.
The optimum in confusion is reached by those cases which speak of the owner's "negli-
gence" in not providing a "seaworthy" vessel. E.g., Miller v. Wessel, Duvall & Co., Inc.,
1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); American Pac. Whaling Co. v. Iristensen, 93
F.2d 17 (C.C.A.9th 1937).
A distinction has been made through historical accident which cannot be borne out in
practice. But on the basis of the distinction different legal incidents have been attached. As
a consequence a difference between absolute liability and "negligence" liability will turn
upon the phraseology of the complaint. If the position of the Sieracki case is taken, it is
difficult to see why injured parties should seek to prove "negligence" in not providing a sea-
worthy vessel when a change of wording will entitle them to recovery merely for showing the
"unseaworthiness". The Sieracki case approves jury trial for these actions, and additional
incentive lies in the fact that only laches serves as a bar to the admiralty suit. Judicial fiat
acting upon the seaworthiness doctrine has to a considerable degree remedied the evil which
the Jones Act was designed to cure, and has done so more effectively.
80. This is the usual statement, and clearly would seem to represent the intent of the
statute. It would seem, however, that the reasonably prudent landlubber is less cautious
than an equally circumspect man of the sea. Note 79 supra.
81. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54(1940).
82. There still seems to be some doubt as to whether the Jones Act incorporates all
amendments affecting the rights of railroad workers, though there is little authority at all.
Research has disinterred but one case which relies explicitly upon this statutory abolition of
the assumption of risk. Roberts v. United Fisheries Vessels Co., 11 F.2d 288 (C.C,A.lst
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753 (1945). Cf. Roberts, J., dissenting in Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 105 (1943) (amendment as to statute of limitations is adopted into the
Jones Act). Benedict seems to be of the opinion that-the Jones Act incoporates only those
rights of railway workers held as of 1920. 4 BENEDICT, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 205. See
note 105 infra.
83. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939).
84. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
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ployers Liability Act, also makes it very clear that the Court will not tolerate
the outlawed defense to re-enter under the guise of "no negligence." Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, sought to make clear the distinction be-
tween "assumption of risk" of the employer's negligence and "assumption
of risk" of ordinary occupational hazards unaggravated by the employer's
negligence8 5 This distinction would seem entirely valid so long as recovery
is not to be predicated upon absolute liability, and recent federal cases indi-
cate that the seaman still assumes the ordinary risks of his employment. It
may be noted, however, that "assumption of risk" in any form seems anath-
ema to the majority of the Court, and that Mr. Justice Frankfurter con-
curred alone.
The essential character of the proceeding as prescribed by the Act renders
it a less convenient instrument for adaptation to altering social objectives
than the relational or contractual obligations of the general maritime law.
Where, by one construction or another its terms have been extended, anom-
alies and internal inconsistencies seem to have resulted through the inter-
action of the other remedies which are available to injured maritime workers.
It had seemed definitely settled that the ambit of the Jones Act remedy
embraced only injuries occurring on navigable waters8 7 But in O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company 8 s a seaman ordered ashore to perform
certain duties was injured in the vicinity of the ship; the Court held, partly
on analogy to its recent decision that an action for maintenance and cure
could be maintained though the injury occurred on shore leave, that the tort
was still essentially maritime 89 and that the plaintiff was entitled to bring
an action under the Jones Act. Though the decision marks a radical depar-
ture from pre-existing doctrine, no rational reason is discernible why the
conclusion should be otherwise. However, like the Employers Liability Act,
the Jones Act, where applicable, has been held to be exclusive as against
remedies provided by state law, even though no employer's negligence can
be shown to have caused the injury and hence no recovery can be had. 2
85. Id. at 68.
86. Bovich v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 482 (N.D.Cal. 1947); Roberts v. United Fish-
eries Vessels Co., 141 F.2d 288 (C.C.A.lst 1944). But cf. Hendriksen v. City of Chicago, 330
Ill. App. 141, 70 N.E.2d 848 (1947); Denesha v. Lake Chelan S.S. Co., 1937 Am. ,Mar. Cas.
1013 (W.D.N.Y. 1937). Loose language to the effect that the seaman assumes no risks
means, of course, absolute liability of the shipowner for all injuries. The result is never
couched in these terms where it is the actual question, however, resort being more easily
made to the label of "unseaworthiness" where recovery is permitted, and Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's distinction being cited where recovery is denied.
87. The Montezuma, 15 F.2d 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); 1 BENEDICT, op. Cit. supra note 3,
at 48, n. 52, 53; 4id. at 206; RoBINSoN, ADmIRALTY § 42 (1939).
88. 318 U.S. 36,43 CoL. L. Rav. 504(1943).
89. The Court avoided the jurisdictional problem discussed in note 56 supra by re-
jecting the locality test and founding admiralty jurisdiction upon the maritime nature of
the service, status, and relationship of the injured seaman. The decision drives a large
wedge into the Plynwuth doctrine, apart from its specific significance to maritime personal
injury law.
90. Northern Coal and Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928). See Employers' Lia-
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Seamen injured ashore have formerly had recourse to the remedies provided
by the state's local laws,9' and the Supreme Court has approved such re-
covery since there was "no pertinent federal statute." 92 Whether the state
laws have now been superseded through the extension of the Jones Act rem-
edy to shore injuries or whether the "exclusive remedy" decisions are to be
deemed overruled sub silentio is an unresolved question. There are indica-
tions that this particular expression of traditional judicial benevolence to-
ward seamen may prove a boomerang."
The very recent case of Nowery v. Smith, 4 though exceptional in its factual
context and to that extent limited in its implications, demonstrates how the
Court's new arguments may be combined to achieve a startling result. There
a seaman drinking beer in a barroom was assaulted by the chief engineer's
mate of his own ship, and brought suit against his employer for indemnity
under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure. The court reasoned that
under the Waterman doctrine the injured mariner was "in the service of the
ship" and clearly entitled to maintenance and cure; that, by the same token,
a seaman engaging in the traditional mariners' technique of rehabilitation
was thereby acting "in the course of his employment"; that the O'Donnell
rule permits the suit though the injury occur on land; and that the shipowner
must be held liable on grounds of negligence in employing upon his ship an
engineer of such brutal and callous nature. The decision vitiates the "course
of employment" requirement prescribed by the Jones Act. If followed, it
also renders any injury ashore "maritime" 15 and compounds the difficulties
of adjusting state and federal law.
bility Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233, 237 (1930) (concurring opinion by Stone, J.);
cf. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917); N.Y. Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S.
147 (1917). Cf. further Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Panama R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1929); Frame v. City of New York, 34 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 316 (1939).
* 91. Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 74 F.2d 364 (C.C.A.5th 1934); Kulczyk v. Rock-
port S.S. Co., 8 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.Mich. 1934); O'Brien v. Calmar S.S. Co., 104 F.2d 148
(C.C.A.3d 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939). A standard common-law cause of action
against the shipowner lay, however, for the injury on the land. Mullen v. Easter Tr. Co.,
25 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.Pa. 1938).
92. State Ind. Comm'n of N.Y. v. Nordenholt, 259 U.S. 263,276 (1922).
93. This possibility is no longer hypothetical. The Betsy Ross, 145 F.2d 688 (C.C.A.
9th 1944); Ruljanovich's Case, 1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 102 (D. Ct. App. Cal. 1943) (fisherman
injured while getting nets from warehouse held to be in maritime activity and within scope
of Jones Act; state compensation award annulled, and cross appeal alleging negligence under
Jones Act dismissed as unsupported); Johnson v. Harms Co., 1946 Am. Mar. Cas, 1555
(C.P.N.J. 1946) (barge captain ashore buying provisions struck by auto; state compensa-
tion denied because the state law cannot apply to "maritime torts"). If these cases are
followed, and the seaman now carries a Midas' touch that renders all his accidents cognizable
by the admiralty court, it is clear that compensation as against his employer is out of the
question unless he is cautious to be injured by a fellow servant.
94. 69 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.Pa. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 732 (C.C.A.3d 1947).
95. The cases at note 93, supra, do not seriously discuss the maritime nature of the in-
jury, but merely seem to assume that the extension of the Jones Act remedy thereby pre-
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The fiction that longshoremen are "seamen" -" has suddenly been resusci-
tated by the Sieracki decision. 7 Displaying that largeness of mind which
is not dismayed by the hobgoblin of consistency, the Supreme Court on the
very day the Sieracki opinion was rendered, refused to permit a longshore-
man to sue under the Jones Act where he was injured on the dock (land)
by a life raft fallen from the ship, even though under the O'Donnell decision,
a "seaman" injured ashore could have brought suitP The longshoreman,
as the law now stands, would thus seem to be a "seaman" for purposes of
suit under the Jones Act, so long as he is careful to be hurt aboard ship.P
Other "seamen" may be injured where they please. Query the stevedore
injured on the dock who brings suit under the seaworthiness doctrine? If
such an action is permitted, the doctrine of seaworthiness is extended
to land injuries. If not, will the "uniformity" of the nation's admiralty
law be jeopardized by the continued application of state remedies to
"seamen"? It is difficult to ascribe the present disorder and tenuous dis-
tinctions to inevitable principle or rational policy.
Certain procedural aspects of the Jones Act are settled beyond question. 1C3
The rights under the Act may not be enforced in rein, 11 though they may
be enforced by a libel in personam on the admiralty side of the court 102 since
cludes application of the state remedy. The Jensen doctrine, of course, underlies the entire
problem.
96. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926); Buzynski v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 277 U.S. 226 (1928); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142
(1928); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) (injury occurred in 1925); Uravic v.
Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234 (1931) (injury in 1926). The courts have been consistently troubled
with the problem of ascertaining who is a seaman for purposes of suit under the Jones Act.
Some of the results have been interesting. See Robinson, The Seaman in American Ad-
miralty Law, 16 B.U.L. Rav. 283 (1936), where the cases are collected.
97. Writing without benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), Professor Robinson and some courts were of the opinion that
the fiction had ceased to have operative existence. RoluNso., ADMIRALTY §40 (1939);
Nogueira v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 32 Fed. 179, 181 (C.C.A.2d 1929); Lawson v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 94 F.2d 193 (C.C.A.Sth 1938).
98. Swanson v. Mlarra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). The arguments of the case are not
entirely persuasive if the reasoning of the O'Donnell and Harerty cases are accepted. The
court at least implies that a factor in the decision lies in the gearing of the O'Donnell decision
to the crew member's right to maintenance and cure. It seems clear that the longshoreman
has no claim to this remedy. See note 28 supra.
99. The longshoreman's character as a "seaman" is apparently not sufficiently perva-
sive to permit him to pursue a remedy in the federal courts without filing bond as is per-
mitted to "seamen" under 40 STAT. 157 (1917), as amended, 40 STAT. 683 (1918), 28 US.C.
§ 837 (1940). Raccuglia v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); DiStefano v.
Ropner & Co., 57 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
100. The procedural aspects of an action under the Jones Act are treated extensively in
the leading treatise at 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 612; scd carcat lector.
101. Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928); see cases assembled in 1 BE..;EDICT,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 44 n. 39.
102. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). Consult 1 BENEDI c, Op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 44 n. 38.
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indemnity for negligence is now a maritime right. The terms of the statute
provide for jury trial, and this may be obtained either in the state courts or
on the common-law side of the federal court." 3 Though some early cases
were contra, it is now clear that the provision of the Employers Liability Act
prohibiting removal of a suit to the federal court is also applicable to suits
under the Jones Act,' 4 and it now seems established that the statute of limi-
tations of three years under the 1939 amendment of the Employers Liability
Act also applies to the Jones Act.'0 5
The ambiguous interlacing of both venue and jurisdiction concepts in the
last sentence of the Act has, however, been the source of constant difficulty.
Following the Supreme Court's construction that the word "jurisdiction" as
used here really means "venue", 0 6 the further doctrine has developed that
103. Id. at 44 n. 37. Under the Jensen doctrine the principles applicable remain con-
stant irrespective of forum.
104. The principle is now agreed upon. Fiolat v. Minnesota-Atlantic Tr. Co., 31 F.
Supp. 219 (D. Minn. 1940); Note, 21 Onio Ops. 308 (1941). Difficulties are encountered in
its application, however. During the war considerable question arose as to the legal relations
of seamen on ships owned by the United States but being operated by private general
agents. The agent companies attempted to remove Jones Act suits brought against them on
the ground that they were not employers of the injured seamen, and that they could not be
sued under the Jones Act, and that, therefore, the suits could be removed as a normal suit
where the jurisdictional requisites are present. Since in many cases the only real issue in-
volved was the establishment of the employer-employee relationship, such a maneuver, if
successful, provided a non-jury adjudication of the case in a forum other than that of tile
plaintiff's choosing. The problem is well analysed in Gunderson v. Barber Asphalt Corp.,
71 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), where the court refused to go beyond the face of the com-
plaint to inquire into a "decisional" fact, though it would examine, e.g., the validity of an
allegation of diversity since such averment concerns only a "jurisdictional" fact. Contra:
Steele v. American South African Line, 62 F. Supp. 636 (N.D.Cat. 1945); Baker v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.Cal. 1944); cf. Shantz v. American Dredging Co.,
138 F.2d 534 (C.C.A.3d 1943).
The particular problem has been solved by the decision of the Supreme Court that the
general agent may be considered the employer for purposes of suit under the Jones Act.
Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 328 U.S. 707 (1946). But the extent to which the
district court will examine the complaints on remand petition remains unclarified,
105. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1940). Keil v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 431
(D.Md. 1946); Royle v. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co., 269 App. Div. 762, 54 N.Y.S.2d 778
(2d Dep't 1945); Streeter v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 49 F. Supp. 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
Whether the limitation merely cuts off the remedy or totally extinguishes the right is not
entirely clear. 'Compare Roeper v. American Pres. Lines, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 452 (Slip. Ct.
San Francisco, Cal. 1947), with Osbourne v. United States, 1947 Am. Mar. Cas. 930 (S.D,
N.Y. 1947) (American seamen injured just before being made Japanese prisoners of war for
the duration of hostilities; the former opinion finding that the time does not start to run
until access to the court is possible, the latter holding the limitation absolute). A possible
third rationale is represented by Crescitelli v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.Pa. 1946)
(the limitation termed "jurisdictional" and complaint brought after three year period dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction).
106. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). The Court was fearful of con-
stitutional difficulties possible if the Jones Act were construed to permit these actions to be
tried only on the law side of the court, since they are "maritime." The "saving to suitors"
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this "limitation" of "venue" applies only to actions brought on the common-
law side of the federal courts.107 Thus, on the admiralty side of the court,
though the right to indemnity may not be brought in rem, valid service
on the defendant may be made by foreign attachment, the "jurisdiction'
(venue) clause being wholly irrelevant. 03 Beyond this, the cases are in irrec-
oncilable conflict on the jurisdictional and venue requisites for sustaining a
Jones Act proceeding on the common-law side of the United States courtsc,3
clause then permits them to be instituted in the state courts, and since the "jurisdictional"
sentence of the Act could obviously have no application to state proceedings, the Court
felt that it was necessary to reduce the sentence to a venue provision, waivable by the
defendant. Bainbridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278 (1932). It is sug-
gested that the conclusion is not forced by the argument. See note 109 infra.
107. Arthur v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 72 F.2d 662 (C.C.A.Sth 1934)
(distinguishable as being a Canal Zone case); McDaniel v. Baker Sand & G. Co., 24 F.2d
987 (S.D.AIa. 1928); Evans v. Nicholson Transit Co., 1947 Am. Mfar. Cas. 687 (N.D.Ohio
1944); Bennett v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 871 (D.Md. 1940); McKola v. Mc-
Cormick S.S. Co., 24 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.Cal. 1938); Eckert v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 13
F. Supp. 342 (E.D.Pa. 1935). Contra: Joralemon v. South Atlantic S.S. Co., 39 F. Supp.
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); The Ml. E. Farr, 38 F. Supp. 8 (V.D.N.Y. 1940); Pomona, 1938 Am.
Mfar. Cas. 1357 (S.D.Cal. 1938); Bannon v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 52 F.2d 886 (S.D.
Ga. 1930).
108. Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (C.C.A.3d 1941), 51 YALE L. J. 869
(1942).
109. The language employed in the last sentence of the Act allows of a number of possi-
ble constructions. The simplest view that could be taken is that the statute means what it
says in granting "jurisdiction" to the district court of the district wherein defendant resides
or has his principal office, regardless of the presence of other grounds of federal jurisdiction.
A few cases seem willing to permit the clause to do double duty in this fashion. Lindquist v.
Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (C.C.A.3d 1942); Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Nordyke, 140 F.2d 902
(C.C.A.Pth 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 760 (1944); Kuhlman v. Fletcher Co., 20 F.2d 465
(C.C.A.3d 1927); cf. McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Co., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D.Mass. 1947);
Peters v. Detroit Nay. Co., 24 F.2d 454 (\.D.N.Y. 1927) scm ble.
The Dilkes case is not squarely in point, for the decision actually made is that an action
for maintenance and cure is within the jurisdiction of the District Court where joined with a
Jones Act suit, though the latter be dismissed, but the decision assumes the original jurisdic-
tion over the Jones Act suit.
A second possible construction is that the sentence is a designation of venue only and
that, in addition, there must be independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. Adopting this
view, some courts have taken the position that the Act creates a genuinely maritime cause
of action and thus independent grounds of jurisdiction are found in U. S. Co.sST. Art III, § 2,
and 28 U.S.C. § 41 (a) (1940). McMenamin v. McCormick S.S. Co., 37 F. Supp. 908 (N.D.
Cal. 1941); see Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 324 (1927); Sevin v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 88 F.2d 988, 989 (C.C.A.Sth 1937); Mullen v. Easter Trans. Co., 25 F.
Supp. 62 (E.D.Pa. 1938).
Other courts have said that the independent grounds of jurisdiction are found in the
evistence of a suit arising under the laws of the United States and accordingly have re-
quired the jurisdictional amount of $3,000. Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 193
(N.D. Ohio 1942), 56 HARV. L. RyV. 1161 (1943); see Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375, 383-4 (1924) (it would appear to the writer that this statement by the Supreme
Court is conclusive, but the citation is seldom relied upon); Smith v. Nicholson Universal
S.S. Co., 42 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D.N.Y. 1941) semble; Branic v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 152
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The unfortunate nature of this state of affairs is underscored by the tendency
to dismiss the complaints rather than transfer them to the admiralty docket.
Additional complexities are introduced where the complaint combines causes
F.2d 887 (C.C.A.3d 1945), discussed at note 110 infra. The opinion in the Rowley case is
extremely confused, but it seems that the $3,000 is needed because this is essentially a law
action, this modern court being persuaded by the fact that the complaint is not called a
"libel." Query the result if the action had been found to be essentially a maritime cause?
Cases which seem to occupy some indeterminate middle ground include Nolan v.
General Seafoods Corp., 112 F.2d 515 (C.C.A.lst 1940); Stevens v. R, O'Brien & Co., 62
F.2d 632 (C.C.A.lst 1933).
The final group of cases are those which attach no significance either to the statutory
or maritime character of a Jones Act suit, and, considering it as any other action, require the
usual diversity and jurisdictional amount. Lima v. Burbank, 1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 1524
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (complaint dismissed for lack of diversity). But, except for Erlich v. Wil-
helmson, 44 F. Supp. 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1942)-a laconic opinion in accord-the cases upon
which the court relies to support its conclusion are not convincing. The Rowley case, su pra,
is cited, but that concerns only the jurisdictional amount and accepts the "federal question"
ground for jurisdiction. Modin v. Matson Nay. Co., 128 F.2d 194 (C.C.A.9th 1942), cited
in the Lima case, concerned the transfer to the admiralty side of the court of a claim for
maintenance and cure after the Jones Act claim had failed of substantiation by the evidence
and been dismissed. This decision would actually imply a position contrary to the purpose
cited. Note too that even the refusal to entertain the maintenance claim is supported only
by Benedict, who gives no authority. The Linia decision also refers to Stamp v. Union
Stevedoring Co., 11 F. 2d 172 (E.D.Pa. 1925), but in that case it is not at all clear that the
injury under discussion is even maritime; the Jones Act is not mentioned as the grounds
for the suit; and further, the court says only that "the usual jurisdictional" requirements
must be met even in admiralty causes of action; diversity of citizenship represents but one
of these general bases for federal jurisdiction. Phila. & R. R. Co. v. Berg, 274 Fed. 534
(C.C.A.3d 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1922), was an action for unseaworthiness and
stands only for the proposition that the "saving to suitors" clause permits such actions to
be maintained on the civil side of the federal courts where the jurisdictional requirements are
present. Cf. Ross v. Pacific S.S. Co., 272 Fed. 538 (D.Ore. 1921), where a similar suit is
remanded to the state court for lack of the jurisdictional amount.
However poorly supported, there are now two square decisions in the New York federal
courts to the effect that diversity of citizenship is necessary to form a basis for a Jones Act
suit. It is submitted that perfectly acceptable bases for jurisdiction may be found without
having to resort to this aberrational and unfortunate position.
Other procedural incidents of a Jones Act suit remain unclarified. A few cases have
tackled the problem of the application to such an action of REV. STAT. § 968 (1875), 28
U.S.C. § 815 (1940), which denies costs to the plaintiff unless the amount in dispute exceeds
$500. In McMenamin v. McCormick S.S. Co., 37 F. Supp. 908 (N.D.Cal. 1941), the statute
was held inapplicable. Contra: Goldberg v. Atlantic Transport Co., 1939 Am. Mar. Cas.
462 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Palm v. Grace Lines, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1936),
The application of the Jones Act to alien seamen has caused some difficulties. The Act
has latterly been held to permit suit by a foreign seaman injured on a foreign vessel. IXyria-
kos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (C.C.A.2d 1945). It had seemed settled to the contrary,
but the majority distinguished the case at bar by the fact that the articles were signed in
the United States. Hand, J., was unable to see the distinction. Subject to this possible new
qualification, the old rule still seems to be applied. O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d
446 (C.C.A.2d 1947); Puig v. Royal Norwegian Gov't, 72 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
The jurisdictional difficulties raised by the special situation where the United States is
the shipowner is not within the scope of this study. See Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
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of action; 110 for district courts are under a disability to conduct a "hybrid"
common-law-admiralty trial, part to the court and part to the jury,"' though
they are quite capable of doing this under the new Federal Rules when sit-
ting as a common-law-equity court.
In view of the remedial nature of the Jones Act, and the usually benign
attitude of the courts in their treatment of the rights of seamen, it seems
highly undesirable to surround the federal statutory remedy by a maze of
conflicting jurisdictional barriers.
The Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
Following the declaration by the Supreme Court that the states' work-
men's compensation acts could not apply to maritime injuries, because such
legislation would work "material prejudice to the characteristic features of
328 U.S. 707 (1946), reversing 176 Ore. 662, 158 P.2d 275 (1945); Note, Remedies of Mfer-
chant Seamen Injured on Government Owned Vessels, 55 YALE L. J. 584 (1946); 34 GEo. L. J-
367 (1946). The doctrine of the Hust case must now be considered limited by the later deci-
sion in Caldarola v. Thor Eckert Co., 67 Sup. Ct 1569 (1947). There the court held that
though the Hust case renders the general operating agent an "employer" liable to suit under-
the Jones Act, he is not to be considered responsible for torts to third parties. This tenuous.
and dubious structure was erected against the dissent of four of the Justices. The situation;
as respects remedies against the government has also been modified by American Stevedore-
Co. v. Porello, 67 Sup. Ct. 847 (1947). The case corrected the long standing misapprehen-
sion that suit for maritime personal injuries or death may be brought against the govern-
ment only under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-50
(1940), 39 YALE L. J. 1189 (1930); for the decision holds that the Public Vessels Act, 43
STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1940), also provides a proper remedy for torts by public
vessels to the person and not just to property.
110. The problem of proper venue is complicated by the variant federal venue provi-
sions geared to different grounds of jurisdiction. Branic v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 152 F.2d
887 (C.C.A.3d 1945), illustrates the issue. There action was instituted in plaintiff's district
alleging "unseaworthiness" and negligence under the Jones Act. The jurisdictional ground'
for the former, brought by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause, was diversity; and thus
venue was proper either in plaintiff's or defendant's district. 49 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28.
U.S.C. § 112 (1940). Since jurisdiction was not based upon diversity alone, however (the
court apparently recognizing the "federal question" source of jurisdiction over the Jones
Act suit), the venue was held improper and the case remanded with orders to dismiss unless.
the Jones Act allegations were wi'thdrawn. The conflicts between this analysis and that
which holds forced election to be error is apparent.
For authority that a Jones Act suit against the employer may be tried together with a
suit against the third party tort feasor see Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp.,.
1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Contra: Ginsburg v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J.,
1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Efforts are being made to restrict the venue provisions of the Employers Liability Act;
and H.R. 1639 regarding the matter has passed the House of Representatives. 93 Coo.
REc. 7497 (June 19, 1947), 7537 (June 20, 1947), 9276 (July 16, 1947), 9353, 9369 (July 17,
1947), 9415 (July 18, 1947). The effects of the bill upon the dependent Jones Act seem not
to have been discussed.
111. See Kuhlman v. Fletcher Co., 20 F.2d 465, 467 (C.C.A.3d 1927); McDonald v.
Cape Cod Trawling Co., 71 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D.Mass. 1947).
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the general maritime law," 112 Congress twice amended the Judiciary Act in
an attempt to authorize the states to include maritime workers within the
purview of their compensation schemes."1 3 Both amendments were stricken
down as representing an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,114
the Court, however, hinting broadly that a federal statute applying uni-
formly throughout the nation would be a valid exercise of the federal legis-
lative power over matters maritime." 5 The implication was not lost, and in
1927 there was enacted the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.
116
The substantive aspects of the Act are in no way extraordinary, and like
all such statutes, the administrative machinery provided is admirable for
its simplicity.1 7 Compensation according to a fixed schedule is paid by the
employer where one within the coverage of the Act is injured; 118 the remedy
is exclusive as against the employer, except that where he fails to make pay-
ment, suit at law or admiralty nmay be instituted. 19 This provision virtually
emasculates the holding that longshoremen are "seamen" for purposes of a
suit under the Jones Act, for the compensation statute, where applicable,
represents an exclusive remedy as against the employer while an action under
the Jones Act may be instituted only against an employer. Under recent
decisions, the election to sue a third party is not foreclosed by the acceptance
of compensation, a formal award being necessary to constitute a bar. 2 '
The difficulties encountered in administration of the Act, however, derive
from the peculiar conditions which determine the scope of its application.
In general it applies to all maritime workers injured on navigable waters,
but this is subject to two large exceptions. At their request, masters and
crew members were expressly excluded from the operation of the Act.121 The
112. So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244U.S. 205,216 (1917).
113. 40 STAT. 395 (1917); 42 STAT. 634 (1922).
114. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); State of Washington v.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
115. Id.at 227.
116. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 52 STAT. 1164 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 900-50 (1940).
117. The provisions of the Longshoremen's Act are well presented at 1 BENEDICT, Op. cil.
supra note 3, §§ 27, 141c-147; 4 id., §§ 628-643; ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY § 15 (1939).
118. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 52 STAT. 1164 (1938), 33 U.S.C. §§ 908-9 (1940).
119. Id. § 905.
120. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 67 Sup. Ct. 847 (1947), settles the matter.
See Ruggiero v. Norwegian Shipping & Trading Mission, 49 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
however, where suit is dismissed against the third party tort feasor under the state rule that
acceptance of compensation bars suit. If this decision is accepted such actions must be
brought only in the federal courts. The implications of the Jensen doctrine would seem to
be in direct conflict.
121. Like the Railway Brotherhoods, the seamen were better pleased with the larger
awards possible under the modified common-law suit under the federal statutes. See No-
gueira v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 281 U.S. 128, 136 (1930). And see the Congressional
Committee reports in footnotes to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The arguments
are pursuasively presented in a statement by Andrew Furuseth in AXTELL, MERCHANT
SEAMEN'S LAW 75 (1943).
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second limitation derives from Congressional malleability at the hands of a
demanding Supreme Court. Fearful of exceeding its constitutional mandate,
Congress sought the limited objective of drafting a buffer statute designed
to provide a remedy interstitial to the existing maritime remedies and the
remedies provided by state law. Under the "maritime but local" doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court as a limitation upon the stricture of the
Jensen decision, state law was free to operate with regard to matters mari-
time where it wrought no material prejudice to the essential "uniformity"
of the general law of admiralty. 122 The Longshoremen's Act incorporates
this nebulous concept and excepts from its coverage all injuries compensable
under state law.12'
Thus a new statutory remedy was sandwiched in among the admiralty
doctrines, the Jones Act, and the state laws, applicable wherever it is found
that a "maritime worker" who is not a "master or crew member" 124 suffers
an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" where the in-
jury occurs on "navigable waters" but is not covered by state law, i.e., is not
"maritime but local." It would be difficult to construct a more unpredict-
able series of definitional tests. State compensation acts encounter sufficient
difficulty in assessing whether the injury was an "accident arising out of and
in the course of employment"; the federal statute requires three other
tests of equal vagueness and a fourth, the "maritime but local" criterion,
which has absolutely no relevance to fact. The decisions attempting to seg-
regate matters "maritime" from those "maritime but local" are completely
irreconcilable, and understandably so.'
25
It was inevitable that in some instances suitors should be unable to out-
guess the decision on all of the "tests" and be barred by a statute of limita-
tions from pursuing another remedy, or should remain remediless where both
the state and federal commissions deny jurisdiction.' -' The Alphonse-
Gaston provision in many state statutes limiting their application to those
injuries not covered by the federal statute gives rise to a jurisdictional test
defined in terms of itself and tends to increase the chances of mutual dis-
claimer of jurisdiction. 12
122. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v.
Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). The exception was implicit in the Jensen decision itself. 244
U.S. 205,216 (1917).
123. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 52 STAT. 1164 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).
124. The courts encounter as much difficulty in excluding "masters and crew members"
from the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act as they do in defining "seamen" for purposes
of the Jones Act. The decisions are collected in 4 BENEDICT, op. Cit. supra note 3, §§ 635-6.
125. Cases are collected in 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 612. See alzo Hughes,
Jurisdicional Conflicts Between Admiralty and Common Law Courts, 6 TEx.B.J. 156 (1943);
Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and tie Maritime Law, 38 YALE L.J. 472 (1929); 1
LOYOLA L. REV. 74 (1941); 7 U. op PITT. L. REv. 262 (1941); 10 U. or Cur. L. REv. 339
(1943).
126. It is to be noted, however, that the two year limitation provided in the Longshore-
men's Act does not begin to run if a suit is begun under the Jones Act until that suit is ad-
judicated. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 52 STAT. 1164 (1938), 33 U.S.C. § 913(d)
(1940).
127. The entire problem is well discussed in 53 YALE L.J. 348 (1944).
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When the problem was brought directly before the Supreme Court,1 28 its
solution was to declare a special "twilight zone," where precedent would be
of no assistance, and to hold that a presumption would operate in favor of
the jurisdiction of the forum which the suitor had selected. The decision
would appear to be of some assistance in protecting the injured worker but
it raises another unanswerable question for determination; viz., whether the
facts in the situation are sufficiently without precedent to warrant classifi-
cation of the suit in the "twilight zone" where it would be entitled to the
presumptions.129
In declaring the "twilight zone" doctrine, the majority of the Court de-
clined to follow Mr. Chief Justice Stone who wished to take the opportunity
presented to overrule the Jensen case and with it the derivative "maritime
but local" doctrine. 130 As the situation now exists, moreover, the majority
has indicated its view that overruling the Jensen case would be immaterial
since the Longshoremen's Act has enacted the "maritime but local" doctrine
into statute, and that in interpreting the statute the determination would
have to be made anyway.' 3' Congress is disinclined to amend the statute
while the Jensen decision is on the books, and the Supreme Court will refuse
to consider the constitutional question so long as the problem is presented in
terms of statutory construction. 13 2 The Jensen doctrine seems thus to be a
ghost which none can exorcise; and the Longshoremen's Act must continue
to be hobbled by an irrational doctrinal limitation.
The Death on the High Seas Act
As had been the case with the common law, it is probable that under the
general admiralty law there was no right of action for a wrongful death. 3
Unable to tolerate this archaism, the Supreme Court had permitted suit for
maritime deaths under state Wrongful Death statutes prior to the "uniform-
ity" decisions; "I and when the problem next arose after the Jensen case,
the Court evolved its limitational doctrine of matters "maritime but local"
in order to permit the continued application of these statutes.' In line with
the philosophy of the "uniformity" rule, the Congress by virtue of its admi-
128. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), 53 YALE L.J. 348 (1944), 19 VAsih.
L. REv. 32 (1944), 67 N.J.L.J. 125,127,130 (1944).
129. See discussion in 53 YALE L.J. 348 (1944).
130. Davis v. Dep't of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 260 (1943). It would seem, however, that
the majority tacitly vitiates the "constitutional" support for the Jensen rule by giving effect
to the claimant's choice of forum.
131. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
132. The Supreme Court has displayed a similar reluctance before. See Helvering v.
Griffith, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
133. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), was the official determination for American
admiralty law that no such right existed. See ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY § 16 (1939).
134. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907). Robinson, Wrongful Death in Admiralty and
the Conflict of Laws, 36 COL. L. Rav. 406 (1936).
135. See note 122 supra.
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ralty and commerce powers passed the Death on the High Seas Act 'I- a few
months before the Jones Act was adopted. The Act grants a right of indem-
nity to the personal representative, in favor of listed beneficiaries, of any
"person" whose death is caused by "wrongful act, neglect or fault" occurring
on the high seas beyond a marine league from a possession of the United
States. The right is expressly enforceable in ren in the admiralty courts.
There has been surprisingly little litigation under the statute and it seems
to occupy a relatively minor position among the remedies available to in-
jured maritime workers.
Though the Supreme Court has delivered no opinion on the relationship
of the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act, it now seems clear
that the Jones Act will be construed as merely offering an alternative remedy
to the beneficiaries of a deceased seaman. 1" The Death on the High Seas
Act clearly supersedes state Wrongful Death statutes as they were formerly
applied to deaths on the high seas, but by its terms does not affect such state
laws within their own territorial waters. 3 '
Although the statute grants jurisdiction in rent to the admiralty courts,
it seems that the right may also be enforced in any common law court by
virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause.' The statute of limitations under
the Act is for but two years while that for the Jones Act is now three; the
only defense which is modified by the Death on the High Seas Act is con-
tributory negligence and the beneficiaries are limited. These factors sug-
gest reasons for the apparent preference of personal representatives to
prosecute their claims under the Jones Act when applicable.
CONCLUSIONS
Simplicity and symmetry should not be considered the summum banum
to the prejudice of practical considerations of objectives and policies. Nei-
ther, on the other hand, should complexity be tolerated where no rational
policy is subserved. Multiplicity of remedy where the different strands in
the network are closely related entails delay, expense and denial of rights
136. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-8 (1940).
137. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937). The cases are not clear on
the point of damages available. See 1 BFNEDIcr, op. cdt. supra note 3, § 144. Compare
Radisich v. Franco-Italian Packing Co., 1946 Am. Mar. Cas. 288 (D. Ct. App. Cal. 1945)
(damages limited to pecuniary loss of beneficiaries), with Pollard v. Seas Shipping Co., 146
F.2d 875 (C.C.A.2d 1945) (damages for pain and suffering allowed); Alice May, 1944 Am.
Mar. Cas. 392 (D.Mass. 1943); Libby Maine, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
138. A related problem not provided for by federal statute has recently been solved
through the agency of the "maritime but local" figure. Finding no right under general
maritime doctrine to proceed in tort against the estate of a deceased tort feasor, the Supreme
Court classified a personal tort in a state's territorial waters as "maritime but local" and
sanctioned the application of the state's "survivor" statute. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S.
393 (1941).
139. Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946); Elliott v.
Marine Basin Co., 254 App. Div. 739,4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1938).
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through error. There would seem to be little reason in an age of legal realism
and reform, why admiralty law should escape the "critic acid" test, or why
there should be perpetuated a complex remedial structure developed over
a long period of time in adaptation to a series of historical accidents and
disfavored doctrines. Brash cutting of the tangled strands by such radical
measures as a merger of law and admiralty is not suggested, but some modi-
fication of the present system for compensating maritime workers for per-
sonal injuries would seem to be in order.There is little doubt that Congress, by virtue of modern views of its com-
merce and admiralty powers, could enact a new Longshoremen's Act applicable
to all stevedores and covering all injuries on land or navigable waters. It
is possible that a genuinely workable solution for the entire problem could
be found in some sort of a workmen's compensation scheme for seamen,
granting to them, in accord with the traditional policy of special privilege
for mariners, higher indemnities and a modified form of the usual "arising
out of" formula. Certainly Congress can amend the Jones Act so as to dis-
solve the jurisdictional cloud which now surrounds it. The rigid barriers
between the common-law and the admiralty sides of the federal courts could
be relaxed at least sufficiently to permit a "hybrid" suit, thereby expediting
litigation through joinders of causes of action with different jurisdictional
requirements and lessening the hardships and delays of dismissal. The Su-
preme Court could overrule the muchly disputed Jensen case and its unnat-
ural progeny, the "maritime but local" doctrine. It could also declare offi-
cially dead the moribund fiction that longshoremen are "seamen" and clarify
the "exclusive" status of the Jones Act remedy as extended to injuries ashore.
The nebulous verbalistic distinctions (and lack thereof) between employer
liability based on "negligence" and that predicated on "unseaworthiness"
present an urgent need for judicial clarification.
Until these or similar steps are taken, essential rights and remedies will
continue to revolve upon a nuance of fact, a twist of interpretation, a random
phrase in the pleadings, or a happenstance of conflicting doctrines. There
would seem to be little evidence of an abatement in the strong tide moving
.toward a guarantee of compensation to the injured worker. But so long as
no rational overall plan is adopted to effectuate this policy, the sporadic
developments of contiguous admiralty remedies will further tangle this elab-
orate web woven piecemeal to provide for one of the simplest of legal reme-
dies-indemnity for personal injury.140




REMIEDIES AVAILABLE TO "SEAMEN" AND "MASTERS AND CREW MEMMERS"
1. The traditional maritime remedies and the Jones Act are limited to "seamen". The
Longshoremen's Act however, excludes "masters and crew members." The terns are here
treated as synonymous, though the courts will not invariably consider them so.
2. The availability of the state remedy against the employer where the seaman is injured
ashore is questionable since the extension of the Jones Act to shore cases.
3. Examples of operable state law are Wrongful Death and Survival statutes.
4. If the Jones Act be recognized as creating a new maritime cause of action (as the better
view construes it), the right to a common law trial is granted by the "Saving to Suitors"
clause as well as by the specific terms of the Act.
5. Query the jurisdictional requirements for suit on the civil side of the federal court.
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APPENDIX II
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO "MARITIME WORKERS" OTHER THAN "MASTERS
AND CREW MEMBERS"
1. The dotted lines represent remedies available so far only to "longshoremen;" but the
content of the word is extremely uncertain.
2. The availability of the Jones Act remedy to "longshoremen" is subject to severe qualh-
fication, for the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Longshoremen's Act presumably
vitiates the doctrine that "longshoremen" are "seamen" under the Jones Act, But a long-
shoreman injured in an activity "maritime but local" might argue that he may still pursue
his Jones Act suit. A similar argument has failed where the longshoreman was injured on
land. If the Jones Act were found applicable in such a case, would the overriding federal
statute preclude the operation of state law even in the "maritime but local" sphere?
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